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ABSTRACT One of the significance of the Second Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD II) in 1998 was its expression of great concern in conflicts
undermining Africa’s efforts to pursue sustainable development. TICAD II also affirmed nec-
essary strong commitment among countries to strengthen African structures and capacities
for conflict response. This paper examines Japan’s foreign policy in supporting the efforts of
African regional and subregional organisations for conflict prevention, management and res-
olution, with the focus on its relationship with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The author proposes Japan to
go beyond the diplomacy of economic cooperation and adopt a security-oriented approach to
support African initiatives in conflict response. 
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INTRODUCTION
In October 1998, the Second Tokyo International Conference on African
Development (TICAD II) was held under the joint auspices of Japan, the United
Nations (UN) and Global Coalition for Africa. The Conference was attended by 80
countries (51 African, 11 Asian, 18 North American and European), 22 non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and 40 international organisations. At the end
of the proceedings, delegates adopted the “Tokyo Agenda for Action,” which
included guidelines for action to be taken by African countries and their develop-
ment partners in order for Africa to achieve social development, economic develop-
ment, good governance and conflict prevention. One of the most significant features
of the Agenda is that it expressed a great concern in conflicts that undermine
Africa’s efforts to pursue stability and sustainable development, thus upholding the
strong commitment among the countries to necessary actions in strengthening
African structures and capacities for conflict response. The necessary actions
declared in the Agenda included continued financial and technical assistance to
strengthen the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and subregional
organisations for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.(1)
TICAD was initially proposed by the Japanese government at the UN General
Assembly in 1991. It was a part of Japan’s diplomatic attempts to play a more active
role in international affairs of the post-Cold War era as an economic power. TICAD
I was held in 1993, when the “Tokyo Declaration on African Development” was
adopted. The Tokyo Declaration emphasised the principles of the African initiative
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and the partnership between African countries and their development partners, and
these ideas were carried on into the Tokyo Agenda of TICAD II.
The two meetings of TICAD were significant in the development of Japan’s
foreign policy towards Africa during the last decade of the 20th century. To follow
up TICAD I and II, Japan convened meetings in Africa to monitor progress
subregion-by-subregion, and hosted the Asia-Africa Forum in ASEAN countries to
discuss South-South economic cooperation. In a policy speech delivered at the
University of Pretoria in May 1999, Keizo Takemi (State Secretary for Foreign
Affairs of Japan), who served as co-chairman of TICAD II, said, “Tokyo
International Conference on African Development is a process for realising Japan’s
new and positive African policy” (Takemi, 1999). In November 1999, on the first
anniversary of TICAD II, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono remarked that the
Tokyo Agenda had gained international recognition and had become the foundation
of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa (MOFA, 1999b). In March 2000, Japanese
ambassadors to Africa agreed that TICAD was the mainstay and an important asset
of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa, and recommended that the Japanese govern-
ment make strenuous efforts to follow up TICAD II (MOFA, 2000).
TICAD visibly demonstrated global awareness of Japan’s increased presence in
Africa. On the other hand, contemporary Japan faces a great challenge in that the
objectives of TICAD are expanding beyond the scope of her TICAD diplomacy.
Japan is not a military power in the international arena because the Article 9 of the
so-called “Peace Constitution” prohibits use of military means to solve international
disputes. As an economic power, Japan has utilised economic wealth for national
strategies in international relations, and it has been reflected in her Africa policy. In
other words, TICAD is the fruit of Japan’s aid policy in Africa.
In close scrutiny, the Tokyo Agenda includes not only economic and social objec-
tives but also political and partly security-related objectives. Although TICAD is
deeply rooted in Japan’s traditional aid policy towards Africa, the author believes
that sole economic cooperation is increasingly inappropriate for Japan to play a
leading role in achieving TICAD’s new goals, namely strengthening African capaci-
ties for conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
This paper examines the nature of Japanese foreign policy in supporting the
efforts of African regional and subregional organisations for conflict prevention,
management and resolution, namely the OAU, which Japan has aided financially,
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which Japan is
currently considering supporting.
BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN’S AFRICAN 
POLICY
Historical development of Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa can be roughly
divided into three periods: the first period (1960-1973); the second period (1973-
1989); and the third period (1989 to present).
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THE FIRST PERIOD (1960-1973): SEPARATING POLITICS FROM THE
ECONOMY
While postwar Japan established diplomatic relations with independent African
states in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, Africa received little consideration from Tokyo
until the oil crisis of 1973. This is mainly because foreign policy-makers of postwar
Japan attached greater importance to developing Japan-US relations and improving
foreign relations with neighbouring Asian countries. Before the oil crisis, no
Japanese ministers visited Africa.
During the first period, however, Japan’s trade with Africa steadily increased.
Japanese exports to Africa rose almost fourfold, from $603 million in 1965 to $2.3
billion in 1973. Japanese imports from Africa also rose more than fivefold in the
same period, from $192 million in 1965 to $1 billion in 1973 (Aoki, 1991: 312-313,
Oda & Aoki, 1985: 153). The most important trading partner for Japan in Africa of
this period was apartheid South Africa. Although Japan was criticised for expanding
trade with South Africa, until the mid-1970’s, Japan followed her traditional
approach of seikei bunri (“separating politics from the economy”), and never formu-
lated a clear government policy to curb trade with the country. The policy of seikei
bunri was originally devised by the Hayato Ikeda cabinet (1960-1964) to apply to
the trade relations with the People’s Republic of China in the absence of a formal
diplomatic relationship. In the 1960’s, Japan applied this policy to foreign relations
with some other countries, such as South Africa (Ochiai, 1995: 133). 
THE SECOND PERIOD (1973-1989): THE OIL CRISIS AND SEEKING
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
The oil crisis, precipitated by the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, marked a turning
point in Japan’s policy towards Africa. The threat of oil embargo by the Arab coun-
tries panicked Japan, an island country with little indigenous supply of natural
resources. At the time, Japan imported 99.8% of her oil, mainly from the Middle
East. In the succeeding depression, Japan’s economic growth rate fell sharply from
around 11% to minus 2% and inflation rate in Japan was higher for a while than in
any other major countries. The oil crisis made foreign policy-makers in Tokyo feel
that no country was more vulnerable to the expansion of Third World resource
nationalism than Japan. Until the early 1970’s, Tokyo had a tacit understanding that
Africa was the “backyard” of Europe. The oil crisis forced Japan to build better
relations with Africa to secure a stable supply of natural resources (Ochiai, 1995:
132-133). 
In 1974 Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura officially visited Ghana,
Nigeria, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Tanzania and Egypt. This
was the first official visit to Africa by a Japanese foreign minister. In his African
tour, Kimura pledged to expand Japan’s trade with Africa, and to increase her devel-
opment aid to help Africa’s self-reliance. He also pledged to lessen Japan’s trade
with South Africa and strictly impose economic sanctions against racist Rhodesia
and South Africa (Gekkan Afurika, 1975). 
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Although Africa’s share in Japan’s total trade did not increase, or rather, gradually
decreased after the mid-1970’s due to such factors as the economic stagnation and
political instability in Africa, Japan quickly expanded Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to African countries after the oil crisis. Japan’s ODA to Africa
increased 53.6-fold from $5 million in 1972 to $268.2 million in 1982, and further
expanded 3.3-fold to $909.7 million in 1991. Africa’s share in Japan’s bilateral
ODA also sharply increased from 1.1% in 1972 to 18.9% in 1980, when it reached
its height. One factor which promoted this rapid expansion of Japan’s development
aid to Africa was the policy of sogo anzen hosho (“comprehensive security”),
officially adopted by the Zenko Suzuki cabinet (1980-1982) as national strategy in
1980. Sogo anzen hosho is the strategy of using diplomatic, economic and cultural
initiatives for securing international as well as Japanese peace and security. A main
pillar of sogo anzen hosho policy was to extend ODA for strategic purposes, and the
policy resulted in promoting the expansion of Japan’s aid to resource-rich Africa
(Ochiai, 1995: 142-144). 
THE THIRD PERIOD (1989 TO PRESENT): AFRICA AS A FRONTIER FOR
JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The end of the Cold War and the succeeding international changes marked
another turning point in Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa. In an informal round-
table talk held in 1989, a few months before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Takashi
Onda, Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), said, “I believe that the year 1989
will be the first year of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa” (Gaiko Forum, 1989:
24). It signalled Japanese intention of playing a greater role in African affairs of the
coming post-Cold War era. 
It could be said that Japan’s foreign policy in general entered a new phase in the
1990’s. Sogo anzen hosho, a slogan popular among Tokyo’s policy-makers in the
early 1980’s, was replaced by a new motto, kokusai koken (“contribution to the
international community”), invoking a willingness for a more active role in interna-
tional affairs. The Gulf Crisis, precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990, provoked a national debate on the direction of Japan’s diplomatic policy in the
post-Cold War world. As a result of such debate, Japan provided a massive financial
contribution of $13 billion to finance the US-led multinational forces and support
the “front-line” states in the Gulf region suffering adverse economic consequences.
Yet, this action was criticised as “cheque-book diplomacy” within and without the
country. The debate on participation of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in the
UN peace activities was activated during and after the Gulf Crisis, and in June 1992
the International Peace Cooperation Bill was approved by the Diet. In September
1992, under the new law, Japan sent approximately 600 SDF construction unit per-
sonnel, 80 military observers, 75 civilian police monitors and 41 civilian election
monitors to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operations
(Tanaka, 1995: 92-97). 
To actively contribute to international peace, in May 1993 Japan also sent about
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50 SDF personnel to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Initially the
Defence Agency and SDF were reluctant to the idea of dispatching SDF to
Mozambique, while the Foreign Ministry was bolder. A high-ranking official of
MOFA informally told a journalist, “the participation in Cambodia’s PKO alone is
not enough for Japan. It is something like graduating from college with minimum
requirements. In order to come up to the standard mark in the international commu-
nity, Japan must participate in at least two UN peace-keeping operations simultane-
ously” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1993). MOFA regarded the dispatch of SDF to
Mozambique, one of the poorest African countries with little ties to Japan, as an
opportunity to show the international community Japan’s initiative in its kokusai
koken policy, and moreover, to prove itself worthy of a permanent membership of
the UN Security Council. The Prime Minister’s Official Residence, in particular then
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, decided
to send SDF to Mozambique mainly because they needed a tangible proof of
Japanese commitment to international peace in the G7 Summit, which Japan was to
host in July 1993.
In the early 1990’s, the idea of kokusai koken greatly influenced Japan’s foreign
policy in general, its Africa policy in particular. Tokyo’s foreign policy-makers
regarded Africa as a frontier for Japan to contribute to global peace and develop-
ment. There were two main approaches for Japan to implement its kokusai koken
policy in Africa: personnel contribution to PKO and more active use of ODA. SDF’s
participation in ONUMOZ was the first case of the former, and TICAD was of the
latter.
As mentioned earlier, Japan’s proposal to hold TICAD was initially made at the
UN General Assembly in New York. It was not at the OAU summit in an African
capital city. The fact signifies the great desire for a diplomatic feat on the part of
Japan. TICAD was an attempt for Japan to show not only African countries but
also the international community its diplomatic commitment towards international
affairs. 
TICAD AND AFRICAN CONFLICTS
In October 1993 TICAD I was hosted by Japan with the objectives of encourag-
ing African efforts towards political and economic reforms, deepening domestic and
international understanding concerning the present conditions in Africa, and sup-
porting African development. At the Conference, the first of its kind for Africa, 48
African countries, 13 donor countries and several international organisations were
represented. 
The 1993 Tokyo Declaration, adopted at the closure of TICAD I, contained sev-
eral goals relating to African development such as political and economic reforms
based on African initiatives, application of successful development experiences in
Asia to Africa, and promotion of South-South cooperation. African conflict issues
were paid little attention in the Declaration, and were just briefly touched upon in
paragraph 20, “We, the participants of TICAD, underscore the need to establish
effective mechanisms for prevention, preparedness, and management of man-made
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and natural disasters in general, and to strengthen food security in particular. We
therefore welcome the decision of the Organisation of African Unity to establish the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and pledge our
support to strengthen the effective functioning of this mechanism.”(2)
At the General Assembly of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in South Africa in April 1996, the Japanese government
proposed to organise TICAD II in Tokyo in 1998. The Preparatory Conference for
TICAD II was held in Tokyo in 1997 to review progress made since TICAD I, to
identify the main themes, and to set up a preparatory committee to formulate the
agenda to be considered at TICAD II. The Preparatory Committee meetings and
Regional Workshops were held in several African cities in 1998 to formulate the
draft of the agenda. In a series of discussions during the TICAD II preparatory
process, it was recognised that peace, security and stability were prerequisites for
sustainable development in Africa, and that the agenda should include peace and
conflict issues. Also, the participants pointed out that significant progress had been
made through intra-regional cooperation in conflict prevention and management in
Africa, and expressed the need to strengthen regional, subregional and national
capabilities for conflict prevention, management and resolution, in particular to
strengthen the capacity of the OAU conflict management mechanism and sub-
regional organisations involved in peace activities.(3) As a result, the 1998 Tokyo
Agenda, adopted at TICAD II five years later, was more concerned with African
conflict issues than the 1993 Declaration.
The Japanese government was non-committal towards including conflict issues as
a main theme in the agenda. Keiko Kokubun (1999: 4), an expert of the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an implemental agency of government-
to-government technical assistance, who was seconded to MOFA for the preparation
of TICAD II and helped in drafting the agenda, wrote, “At first, in terms of the areas
of governance and conflict issues, it was not clear what kinds of concrete objectives
and actions would be identified in the agenda. However, deep concerns of the
Preparatory Committee members over devastating conflicts in Africa pushed the
Committee to frame them.” Her statement reveals that at least initially the Japanese
government was more or less puzzled over how to deal with African conflict issues
within the framework of TICAD. 
African conflicts were an area in which Japan had never been actively involved.
While, by 1989, Japan had become the third largest donor to sub-Saharan Africa
among the member states of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
until the mid-1990’s, Japan’s involvement in African conflict issues was limited to a
few areas of providing humanitarian assistance to such war-affected people as
refugees through the UN organisations and sharing the financial burden of the UN
peace activities in Africa. Partly because Japan does not have any vital national
interests in Africa, and partly because Japan cannot use military means in inter
national relations, Tokyo did not take up any active diplomatic measures towards
conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.
However, as a result of strong requests from the participants of the Preparatory
Committee and the Regional Workshops, the 1998 Tokyo Agenda came to include
conflict prevention and post-conflict development as a basic foundation for African
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development, and specified various guidelines for action to be taken by African
countries and its development partners for Africa to achieve peace and security. The
1998 Agenda called for African countries to involve themselves in intensifying
regional and subregional cooperation and active participation of civil society in
peace-building and conflict prevention. As mentioned earlier, the Agenda declared
Africa’s development partners will take actions such as continued assistance to
strengthening the capacity of the OAU and subregional organisations, supporting
UN and OAU’s efforts to develop an early warning and response system, and taking
necessary action to monitor and prevent the export of small arms to potential con-
flict areas.(4)
TICAD II was a non-pledging conference, and the 1998 Agenda did not detail
how to accomplish African development at the policy level. How should Japan pro-
vide financial and technical assistance to African regional and subregional organisa-
tions? What kind of policy option does Japan have? Which policy option is more
appropriate than others from the view point of Japan?
OAU MECHANISM AND JAPAN
The OAU is the first recipient of Japan’s assistance towards the efforts of African
regional and subregional organisations for conflict response. The OAU, established
in 1963, was initially expected to actively contribute to peace and security in Africa.
The OAU Charter provided for a Commission on Mediation, Reconciliation and
Arbitration to which member states were encouraged to submit their inter-state dis-
putes. However, its facility was hardly ever used, and ad hoc committees consisting
of two or three heads of state in effect mediated and facilitated negotiation of inter-
state disputes. Although ad hoc committees allowed the OAU an entry point to
prevent the escalation of some conflicts, in many cases the OAU’s role in conflict
resolution was limited. The Charter also provided for a Defence Commission.
Within the framework of the Commission, the OAU considered proposals for the
establishment of a comprehensive and permanent system for peace-making and
peace-keeping. But until the end of 1980’s, these proposals had not materialised.
Soon after the end of the Cold War, the OAU summit of July 1990 adopted the
“Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the
Fundamental Change Taking Place in the World.” In the 1990 Declaration, African
leaders pledged themselves to work together towards the peaceful and speedy reso-
lution of all conflicts, and expressed their conviction that the main responsibility for
the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa lay first and
foremost with African states, while welcoming the sympathy, understanding and
assistance of others. Following the adoption of the Declaration, the OAU Secretary-
General Salim Ahmed Salim set in motion the process of consultation on the estab-
lishment of a comprehensive and permanent mechanism for conflict management,
and in 1992 his report was submitted to the OAU summit in Dakar. The 1993 OAU
summit in Cairo declared the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution (MCPMR) within the OAU. 
The MCPMR’s objectives are essentially to anticipate and prevent tense situations
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from evolving into violent conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have
occurred, to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions towards the
resolution of conflicts. The MCPMR was built around a Central Organ with the
Secretary-General and the Secretariat as its operational arm. Furthermore, the OAU
Peace Fund was established to support the operational activities of the MCPMR.
The fund was comprised of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the
OAU, voluntary contribution from member states as well as from other sources
within and without Africa.(5)
Since the inception in 1993, the MCPMR has taken several initiatives in the
Comoros, by sending ministerial delegations to the country for mediation of
Anjouan dispute; in Liberia and Sierra Leone, by supporting the ECOWAS for con-
flict resolution; in Nigeria, by sending a civilian mission to observe the election; and
in Ethiopia and Eritrea, by facilitating the search for a peaceful solution on the bor-
der dispute between the two countries. In addition, the OAU has worked towards the
establishment of an Early Warning System (EWS) to allow for early political action
by the speedy exchange of information in conflict situations. 
Japan’s assistance to these efforts of the OAU for conflict response has been pro-
vided in two ways: financial contribution and intellectual contribution. In 1994,
Japan provided $100 thousand to OAU through the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) to cover a part of costs for convening a seminar on MCPMR in
Cairo. It was Japan’s first financial assistance to the OAU’s efforts for conflict
response. Japan contributed $1.4 million to the OAU Peace Fund from Fiscal Year
1996 to FY 1999. Out of Japan’s financial contribution to the Fund, $200 thousand
was spent for the computer system of the EWS in September 1997, $130 thousand
for an international conference on the dispute in Comoros in December 1997, $50
thousand for a peace process meeting on the conflict in Burundi in June 1998, $50
thousand for an OAU seminar on returnee, refugee and internally displaced women
and children in October 1998, and $190 thousand for an OAU mission to observe
the election in Nigeria in February 1999 (MOFA, 1999a: 3).
The other type of Japan’s support to the OAU’s initiative in conflict response is to
host a so-called “high-level symposium” on peace and conflict in order to provide
the OAU with an opportunity to exchange information with other African organisa-
tions, donor countries and international organisations. MOFA calls this type of sup-
port “intellectual contribution” to enhancing the capacity of the OAU. In October
1995, Japan co-hosted the “High-level Symposium on Peace and Development:
Problems of Conflict in Africa,” to which an OAU high official was invited, in col-
laboration with the UN and UN University in Tokyo. In September 1996, MOFA
also co-sponsored a symposium entitled the “High-level Symposium on Conflicts in
Africa: Road to Nation-building in the Post-conflict Period” with the UK Foreign
Office and Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a research organisation
founded through the initiative of former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The UN,
UNHCR, ECOWAS, EU, OECD as well as OAU were represented at the 1996
Symposium (Aoki, 1997: 12-15).
To sum up, Japan’s assistance to the OAU remains quite moderate, compared
with those of other donor countries. Although Japan has constantly made financial
contribution to the OAU Peace Fund since FY 1996, the total amount of Japan’s
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assistance until FY 1999 was less than 20% of that of the US. This is mainly
because Japan’s assistance to the OAU is allotted from the ODA budget, which has
been strictly restrained or even cut due to financial difficulties since the mid-1990’s.
Japan has never provided direct technical assistance to the OAU. In contrast, for
instance, in February 1999 the UK settled on a comprehensive master plan to
strengthen the capacity of the Conflict Management Centre, which is an operational
section of MCPMR within the OAU Secretariat, and sent several experts to the
Centre. Japan, as mentioned above, has used the method to convene symposiums on
African conflicts as a form of intellectual contribution. Although these symposiums
are useful in the sense that they provide the OAU with opportunities to exchange
ideas and to promote cooperation with other African organisations and international
organisations, their role in strengthening the OAU’s capacity for conflict response is
obviously limited and supplementary.
Japan has found it relatively easy and “comfortable” to provide the OAU with
assistance because the OAU attaches greater importance to conflict prevention than
to conflict resolution. As mentioned earlier, the 1993 Cairo Declaration clearly
stated that the primary objective of the MCPMR was the anticipation and prevention
of conflicts in Africa and that the OAU would undertake not peace-keeping but
peace-making and post-conflict peace missions. The OAU has provided an appropri-
ate counterpart for Japan, whose constitution prohibits use of military means in
international relations. The OAU is more than legitimate as the universal and princi-
pal regional organisation in Africa. 
However, for peace and security in the region, it is vital to enhance African
capacity for conflict resolution in addition to conflict prevention. The OAU lacks
not only finance and expertise but also the political will to undertake costly and
risky peace-keeping functions, and MCPMR, emphasising anticipatory and preven-
tive measures in conflict response, is far from a sufficient condition for Pax
Africana. On the other hand, African subregional organisations today, particularly
ECOWAS, are playing a greater role in conflict resolution than the OAU. In West
Africa in the 1990’s, ECOWAS dispatched its own peace-keeping forces to civil
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and achieved success to some extent. 
These peace activities by African subregional organisations are recently attracting
more attention of Tokyo’s foreign policy-makers. In March 2000, the “International
Symposium on the Roles of Subregional and Non-governmental Organisations in
Conflict Prevention and Peace Initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa” was held in Tokyo
under the joint auspices of MOFA and the Institute for International Policy Studies
(IIPS), a private research institution founded by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone. The OAU and three African subregional organisations, i.e., ECOWAS,
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African
Development Community (SADC), were represented at the 2000 Symposium. The
Symposium, the first of its kind organised by the Japanese government on African
subregional organisations, clearly demonstrated Japan’s growing interest in African
subregional organisations, particularly their roles in conflict response.
Conflict response by ECOWAS and Japan’s policy options to support its initiative
in future merit examining, as it is the most active African subregional organisation
in conflict response in the 1990’s. 
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ECOWAS’ CONFLICT RESPONSE AND JAPAN
Although ECOWAS was established in 1975 as an economic community in West
Africa, it was also initially expected to work as a multilateral framework that would
contribute to subregional peace and security. Shortly after the official establishment,
ECOWAS member states signed the “Protocol on Non-Aggression” and the
“Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence” in 1978 and 1981, respec-
tively. In particular, the latter was a multilateral security pact in the sense that it
provided that, if necessary, ECOWAS would establish the Allied Armed Forces of
the Community for collective intervention in inter-state and intra-state conflicts.
However, the 1981 Protocol existed only on paper until the end of the 1980’s.
Civil wars occurred in Liberia in 1989 and in Sierra Leone in 1991. ECOWAS
dispatched a subregional peace-keeping force called the ECOWAS Cease-fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to the civil wars. Initially established for the peace-
keeping operation in Liberia, the deployment revealed that the ECOMOG was not a
peace-keeping force. For instance, ECOMOG was dispatched without a cease-fire
agreement by all the warring parties and, soon after the intervention, ECOMOG
shifted its role from that of peace-keeper to peace enforcer, and became a main com-
batant without any authorisation by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and
Government. Nigerian presidency actually came to dictate ECOMOG’s missions
and strategies in Liberia. In the case of Sierra Leone, the situation was much worse.
Soon after the occurrence of the 1997 military coup, Nigeria, the subregional
hegemon in West Africa, sent troops to Sierra Leone without first informing the
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. During the conflict, neither the ECOWAS
Chairman (apart from the Nigerian president) nor the ECOWAS Executive
Secretariat exercised any authority and control over the Nigerian-led ECOMOG in
Sierra Leone. The troops were answerable not to ECOWAS but only to their own
countries, although they operated in the name of ECOMOG (Bundu, 1999: 15-16).
The ECOMOG operations in Liberian and Sierra Leone gave rise to much contro-
versy over its legality, neutrality, fairness, mode of deployment, composition, and
command and control of operations (Ochiai, 1999: 35-49).
As these problems were also recognised by ECOWAS member states themselves,
they decided to establish an effective mechanism in order to resolve the problems
and to consolidate the collective management of subregional security. In December
1999, the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security” was signed. According to
the 1999 Protocol, the main objective of the Mechanism was to prevent, manage and
resolve internal and inter-state conflicts within ECOWAS. The Mediation and
Security Council was empowered to decide issues of subregional peace and security
on behalf of the ECOWAS Authority. Also, an Early Warning System (EWS) was to
be built, with the subregion divided into four zones where each Zonal Bureau was to
collect information on security matters. These Bureaux would channel their reports
to an Observation and Monitoring Centre at the headquarters in Abuja. Furthermore,
it was decided that the ECOWAS would establish a renewed ECOMOG as a standby
force, wherein prearranged national contingents would be ear-marked and trained
for deployment on short notice.(6)
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Western countries including the US provided financial and military assistance to
conflict resolution by the ECOWAS in the 1990’s, but Japan never provided assis-
tance to ECOWAS directly. This is partly because Japan was sceptical about the
capacity and neutrality of ECOWAS in conflict response, and partly because MOFA
had no appropriate scheme in its ODA budget to disburse assistance to ECOWAS.
However, following the involvement by the ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone
and its efforts for putting together the 1999 Protocol, Tokyo is increasingly inter-
ested in the role of ECOWAS as a new multilateral actor contributing to conflict
prevention and resolution in West Africa.
The author believes that Japan should actively support ECOWAS in order to pre-
vent the 1999 Protocol from becoming a pie in the sky and to contribute towards
subregional peace and security in West Africa. To support the ECOWAS in conflict
response, Japan has two policy options: financial contribution and technical contri-
bution.
Financial Contribution
It is preferable that Japan makes a financial contribution to ECOWAS. MOFA has
considered providing financial assistance to ECOWAS and a few MOFA officials
informed the author that a contribution of $100 thousand to ECOWAS would be
realised in FY 2000 for the first time. However, there are a few problems on Japan’s
donation to ECOWAS.
First, Japan’s donation to African multilateral organisations including ECOWAS
restricts spending for any military purposes because it is allotted from the MOFA’s
ODA budget. As discussed earlier, for example, the OAU has used Japanese dona-
tion to the Peace Fund for non-military purposes such as holding seminars and pur-
chasing computers, by receiving authorisation of disbursement from the Japanese
government in advance each time. Since the OAU attaches greater importance to
conflict prevention than to conflict resolution, the non-military restriction on
Japanese donation is not a serious problem. However, the ECOWAS has already
played an important role in conflict resolution in West Africa. While ECOWAS is
preparing an EWS for conflict prevention, both the framework and lessons for the
design of the ECOWAS Mechanism were based on the experiences of ECOMOG.
Conflict resolution functions such as the joint military operation of ECOMOG will
continue to be one of the most important pillars in the ECOWAS Mechanism. To
positively contribute to strengthening the ECOWAS, Japan would need to consider
formulating a new budgetary scheme of providing it with a financial contribution
available to be spent on military operations. The author suggests an establishment of
a Special Fund for African Peace in addition to funding the ECOWAS, which will
be distinct from the ODA budget and will give African multilateral security organi-
sations including ECOWAS a good access to appropriate financial assistance. 
Secondly, however, Japan should be more vigilant of how her financial contribu-
tion to ECOWAS is spent. The activities of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone
were problematic, such as the Nigerian dominance in its composition, the resultant
lack of neutrality, the weak legal basis for intervention and the lack of involvement
of ECOWAS member states and the Executive Secretariat in the management of its
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operations. Upon providing financial assistance to the ECOWAS, the Japanese gov-
ernment should push ECOWAS to work harder towards increased legality, trans-
parency and accountability of the Mechanism. As an example, the author proposes
to assist ECOWAS on condition that it adopts a detailed code of conduct for the
implementation of the Mechanism in harmony with the UN Charter. Even after
donation, the Japanese government should scrutinise each spending request from
ECOWAS, and also continuously monitor its activities.
Technical Contribution
Japan has never provided African countries with any direct technical support
including military assistance to enhance African capacity for conflict response. In
contrast, the US, for instance, has promoted its own training programmes such as
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the Pentagon’s Joint Combined
Exchange Training programme (JCET) for enhancing African capacity in peace-
keeping. Within the ACRI framework, the US independently trained more than
4,000 African soldiers by September 1999. The author believes that Japan can pro-
vide ECOWAS with the following forms of technical assistance to enhance its
capacity for conflict response.
First, Japan can play a role in promoting multilateral security dialogues among
ECOWAS member states. While ECOWAS has functioned as a multilateral security
framework in the subregion, multilateral security dialogues among ECOWAS mem-
bers remain immature. There are still persistent tensions and distrusts between indi-
vidual member states and between Anglophone and Francophone states, and they
have often negatively affected civil wars in West Africa. Japan has been actively
involved in the process of multilateral dialogues on the security of the Asia-Pacific
region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Japan’s National Defence
Academy (NDA) has sponsored international seminars on defence science and
invited faculty members of military academies of the Asia-Pacific countries. Also,
the National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) has annually organised the Asia-
Pacific security seminars to promote mutual understanding in the field of defence as
part of its confidence-building measures among military officers from the region.
The author proposes Japan to take an initiative in providing ECOWAS countries
with an opportunity to promote multilateral security dialogues for mutual under-
standing and confidence, as Japan has ample involvement in the multilateral security
dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region. MOFA has already organised some inter-
national symposiums on African conflicts and invited administrative personnel from
African and international organisations. The author suggests that MOFA also organ-
ise an ECOWAS security forum or seminar in cooperation with the Defence Agency
and invite West African military personnel, such as faculty members of military
training institutions, command staff on various levels, and commanding officers of
various units. This will help mutual confidence in the subregion.
Secondly, the author suggests Japan to indirectly contribute to building a more
stable security environment in West Africa by establishing bilateral defence
exchanges such as exchange of students and defence studies. Japan has long been
involved in such exchanges with Asia-Pacific and Western countries on various lev-
48 T. OCHIAI
22-1/2  03.4.8  3:58 PM  ページ48
els. Since Japan accepted Thai students into NDA in 1958 for the first time, a total
of 521 students from the US, UK, China, Germany, France, Australia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Singapore as of May 1998 have
studied at NDA and SDF staff colleges. Furthermore, NIDS has regularly exchanged
progress in defence studies with the defence-related research bodies of Russia,
South Korea and Southeast Asian countries (Defence Agency of Japan, 1998: 159).
However, Japan has never been formally involved in bilateral defence exchanges
with West African countries. Japan does not even station any defence attachés in
sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, under a bilateral defence exchange agreement with
Nigeria, South Korea has regularly accepted Nigerian military personnel into the
training institutions, and has sent its personnel to the Command and Staff College
and the National War College in Nigeria, where a number of West African personnel
are provided with education and training. The author proposes Japan to enlarge the
geographical scope of defence exchanges and commence bilateral defence
exchanges with ECOWAS member states, in particular Nigeria, a subregional mili-
tary power. Japan’s involvement in bilateral defence exchanges with West African
countries will be expected to indirectly contribute to peace and security in the sub-
region. 
Thirdly, the author believes that Japan could deliver some technical assistance to
the ECOWAS in the control of small arms and light weapons. In October 1998, the
“Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of
Light Weapons in West Africa” was adopted by ECOWAS member states. The
moratorium was agreed upon for the initial three years from November 1998, which
may be extended. The Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security
and Development (PCASED) has been stipulated to support the moratorium. Since
uncontrolled accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons have
fuelled conflicts in West Africa, the adoption of the 1998 Declaration was epochal.
Japan has played a leading role in small arms control by chairing the UN Group of
Governmental Experts on Small Arms (established by the UN General Assembly in
April 1996), which has prepared a report on the ways and means to prevent and
reduce the excessive accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons.
While Japan’s first major involvement in arms control occurred with the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, ratified in 1976), until the 1970’s, Japan’s arms con-
trol policy was mostly admonishment by invoking the horrors of the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Drifte, 1990: 60-61). In a sense, Japan’s open
commitment to the control of conventional arms in the 1990’s signalled a maturation
of its arms control policy. Japan should examine appropriate measures to support the
ECOWAS’ efforts for the moratorium on small arms in addition to providing finan-
cial contribution to a PCASED Fund or a UNDP Trust Fund, established to support
prevention and reduction of the proliferation of small arms.
CONCLUSION
In August 1999, a policy paper titled “Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on Official
Development Assistance” was officially announced by the Japanese government.
The paper manifested the will to play an active role in conflict prevention and
post-conflict reconstruction in developing countries, as “conflict prevention, conflict
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resolution and post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction represent crucial chal-
lenges to the global community.”(7) Also, in March 2000, Japanese ambassadors to
Africa recommended that “Japan, as a friend of Africa, should actively be involved
in African conflict and development issues, based on the fundamental ideas
endorsed at the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD II) to support African self-help efforts” (MOFA, 2000). Thus Japan’s Africa
policy-makers are increasingly interested in conflict and development issues in the
region, to explore ways to make good use of development aid, particularly in con-
flict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa.
Japan’s approach is laudable in that it is more or less in harmony with the present
trend within the aid-donor community to regard conflict issues as one of the most
important foundations for African development. However, the author believes that
Japan should take a bold step ahead to actively contribute to peace and security in
Africa, where Japan would provide African organisations such as ECOWAS with a
certain financial and technical assistance to enhance their capability of conflict reso-
lution in addition to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. For this,
MOFA should partly break away from the economic cooperation orientation, which
has dominated its Africa policy leading up to TICAD, and should become security-
oriented with active cooperation from the Defence Agency, SDF, NDA and NIDS.
Simply increasing development aid for supporting Africa’s self-help efforts for con-
flict response is not enough. In order that Japan plays a leading role in realising the
TICAD goal to strengthen African structures and capacity for conflict response,
Japan needs to go beyond the economic cooperation-oriented framework of TICAD
diplomacy.
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NOTES
(1) African Development towards the 21st Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action, adopted at
the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development on 21 October,
1998, par.31.
(2) Tokyo Declaration on African Development: Towards the 21st Century, adopted at the
First Tokyo International Conference on African Development on 6 October, 1993,
par.20.
(3) MOFA, Co-chairs’ Summary Report of the Preparatory Conference for the Second
Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 10-11 November 1997, Tokyo,
par.18-19, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/ticad24.html (as of May 2000);
MOFA, Co-Chairmen’s Summary of the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the
Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2-3 March 1998,
Dakar, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2 /ticad25.html (as of May 2000).
(4) The Tokyo Agenda for Action, par.31.
(5) OAU, Declaration of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government on the
Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management
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and Resolution, adopted in June 1993, par.15, 17, 18, 23.
(6) ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, signed on 10 December, 1999.
(7) Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance, announced by the
Japanese government on 10 August, 1999, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/mid-
term/1999/approach.html (as of May 2000).
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